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Palau is currently at a crossroads. No longer able to rely on the aid and
assistance from Washington that had come to play a central role in its
economy, Palau, which gained independence in October 1994, is faced
with the daunting task of building a self-sustaining national economy in a
turbulent and rapidly globalizing world. This tiny Pacific Island country
has few natural resources to exploit and is unlikely to duplicate the man-
ufacturing-based, export-led growth strategy of the so-called East Asian
model. As in other small island nations, international tourism is currently
being touted as the viable industry for the country, and this in turn has
precipitated debate over the merits of tourism-based development.
International tourism development is often discussed as if it were akin
to selling a commodity in a centralized global exchange—offer the “prod-
uct” on the “market” and customers will “buy” according to the princi-
ples of supply and demand. While such a characterization might be valid
at a highly aggregated, abstract level over the long run, the practical real-
ity of national tourism development is one in which, to use the language
of neoclassical economics, a variety of “externalities” “distort” the mar-
ket and structure the opportunities available to countries in very signifi-
cant ways. This is fundamentally true of small island nations like Palau
that depend on air transport as the primary medium for conveying
inbound tourists. Under the current international air transport regime,
outcomes are as much a product of the highly political process of inter-
state negotiations as they are of market forces. Tourism flows are also
affected by such factors as the degree and character of sovereignty pos-
sessed by a state, the idiosyncrasies of diplomatic relations, and the eco-
nomic policies pursued by states exporting and importing tourists. All of
these shape the flow of tourists and tourism development funds across
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national boundaries. What is commonly referred to as the economics of
international tourism is more correctly understood as a political economy
of interstate tourism development. In weighing options and developing
strategies for tourism development in Palau, it is important to recognize
the structural features of the political economy of interstate tourism at
work.
This paper analyzes the political economy of tourism development in
Palau from a regional and historical perspective. It begins with a general
discussion of the larger context of the development of international tour-
ism in the Asia-Pacific region. As detailed in that section, in recent decades
Asia-Pacific tourism has in large part been the story of the expansion of
Japanese overseas tourism, with its distinctive set of modalities and geo-
politics, followed more recently by the emergence, on a much smaller scale,
of the overseas tourism of the East Asian newly industrializing economies.
The next section outlines the regional context of tourism development in
Palau and reviews how tourism and tourism development have unfolded
in Micronesia since the late 1960s. I argue that the distinctive contours of
political status in the region interacted with the development pattern of
Japanese overseas tourism to produce a distinctive geography of tourism
and tourism development in the region surrounding Palau. This regional
context frames the next section, which focuses on Palau’s experience with
tourism. The concluding section outlines some implications.
Patterns of Overseas Tourism in Asia and the Pacific
Japan is currently the dominant source of tourists visiting Micronesia,
although in the last decade or so there has been significant growth in the
number of tourists from South Korea and Taiwan (table 1). The dominance
of Japanese tourism and the recent emergence of Taiwanese and South
Korean overseas tourism are not unique to the Micronesian region, but
reflect a general trend in the evolution of the global tourism industry over
the last three decades. The rapid growth in the number of Japanese over-
seas travelers as that country attained “economic superpower” status has
been one of the most significant global trends in international tourism.
Historically, the number of Japanese overseas travelers, most of whom are
tourists, began to exhibit a secular growth pattern following the loosen-
ing of controls on foreign exchange and external travel in 1964. Not until
eight years later, in 1972, however, did the total number exceed one mil-
lion, a figure that doubled the next year. Japanese overseas travel contin-
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ued to grow at an exponential rate thereafter, thanks to impressive eco-
nomic growth, further foreign exchange liberalization, rapid appreciation
of the yen, and the rapid increase in the number of airline seats world-
wide associated with the introduction of wide-body jets (figure 1). As a
consequence of this growth, and stagnant growth in inbound tourism,
Japan has emerged as the world’s largest net exporter of tourist dollars.
The growth pattern encouraged a distinctive organizational format in
the business of servicing Japanese tourists (Carlile 1996). This format
appears to have been duplicated in the Taiwanese and South Korean over-
seas tourism industries, although this has not been studied systematically.
Rapid growth from a minuscule base meant that neither existing foreign
travel firms nor tourist facilities at overseas destinations were adequately
prepared to service the burgeoning numbers of Japanese tourists. Japan-
ese firms saw an opportunity to establish a solid foothold in the market
by offering travel services—eg, predeparture briefings, reservations, tour
escorts, Japanese-language assistance, cultural sensitivity to Japanese pre-
dilections—that could not be effectively provided by foreign firms at the
time. Furthermore, because until the 1980s Japanese income levels were
lower than those of most industrialized countries, there was great pressure
to keep costs and prices down. The low-cost package tour created out of
massive bulk prepurchases of airline seats, hotel room reservations, and
other services quickly became the dominant mode of overseas travel and
Table 1. Visitor Arrivals in Micronesia and Hawai‘i
Northern 
Palau Marianas Guam Hawai‘i
(1997) (1996) (1997) (1995)
No % No % No % No %
Japan 20,507 28 438,462 60 1,113,012 81 1,998,860 30
South Korea 1,782 2 187,881 26 119,118 9 104,550 2
Taiwan 31,246 42 6,077 1 22,453 2 62,750 1
Other 20,184 27 103,697 14 118,627 9 4,463,020 67
Total 73,719 736,117 1,373,210 6,629,180
Sources: Guam Visitors Bureau; CNMI Visitors Bureau; Palau Visitors Author-
ity.
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gave Japanese overseas tourism a decidedly “mass” quality. Although
such practices are hardly unique to the East Asian travel industry, the need
to keep the price of tour packages low encouraged the extensive use of
kickbacks and commissions at tour destinations (ie, payments to tour
operators and escorts bringing tourists to a local business or attraction)
to make up for limited revenue at the tour package’s point of sale.
Mass tourism based on prepackaged tours has encouraged a hierarchi-
cal oligopolization of the industry. The top five Japanese travel agencies,
all of whom engage in bulk packaging of outbound tours, have been esti-
mated to control about two-thirds of the outbound travel market
(Nozawa 1992, 229). The large capital resources of these mega-agencies
give them the ability to buy huge quantities of airline seats, hotel rooms,
and various other services from suppliers at highly discounted rates, usu-
ally via contracts negotiated semiannually. In turn, this ability has struc-
tured the industry in a particular way. First, the system has encouraged
the participation of the largest travel agencies in the leading overseas
travel destinations. Needless to say, bulk purchasing works best where
the “raw materials” of travel packages are available in bulk, and precisely
for this reason mainstream Japanese overseas tourism has been heavily
oriented toward tour destinations with large hotel developments well-
Figure 1. Total numbers of overseas travelers from selected East Asian coun-
tries. (Sources: Travel Journal 1994, 229–230; http: //www.jnto.go.jp /12jntowho/
12frame.html; Huang, Yung, and Huang 1996, 224; http://www.apot.com /
groindex.html; Korea Statistical Yearbook 1994, 60; 1997, 80.)
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serviced by major airlines. Second, the system has encouraged vertical
integration. Wholesalers purchase tour package “parts” (eg, airline seats,
hotel rooms, tickets to tourist attractions) well beyond what they need for
their own clients, both to reduce unit costs (other things being equal, the
larger the purchases, the larger the discounts and commissions received
from suppliers) and to assure access to choice seats and rooms for their
clients during the profitable peak seasons. The excess is resold to smaller
travel agencies and discount brokers for sale in secondary markets. As a
result, on the retail side of the Japanese travel industry, numerous smaller
retail agencies maintain an “affiliation” (also known as a keiretsu tie)
with the larger firms that supply them with “parts” and packages (Isozaki
1993; Travel Journal 1994, 53–54; Kojima 1995, 32–33, 47–49). Third,
despite the tendency toward vertical integration, opportunities do exist
for smaller, specialized travel firms. For instance, given their higher per-
sonnel and organizational costs and orientation toward large-scale trans-
actions, it is simply not worth the effort for the major wholesalers to
directly service smaller destinations. Small, “niche” wholesalers have
emerged, who can provide discounted parts and packages to larger firms
in less popular destinations.
A fourth feature of the system, and one that also represents a limit on
the tendency toward vertical integration, can be seen in the continuing
control maintained by foreign suppliers over key “parts.” Other things
being equal, the logic of vertical integration should be just as compelling
in the “upstream” direction as in the “downstream” direction, as is sug-
gested by the existence of wholesalers who are affiliates or subsidiaries of
airline companies (notably, JALPAK [associated with Japan Airlines], All
Nippon Airways World, Japan Air Systems Enterprises) and certain hotel
chains that have affiliations with airlines and large travel agencies (eg,
Japan Airlines’ Nikko chain, Tokyu’s Pan-Pacific chain, Japan Travel
Bureau’s association with Intercontinental Hotels). Nevertheless, complete
upstream integration of the Japanese overseas travel industry has been
hampered historically for a number of reasons. Because the industry was
oriented toward the world’s major tourist destinations, it was confronted
in such destinations with preexisting, well-established foreign hotels and
hotel chains (Travel Journal 1994, 224–227). As developments in Hawai‘i
and other destinations indicate, Japanese interests were still capable of
taking over properties and building new ones, but the strength of exist-
ing American and European hotel chains meant that oligopolization by
Japanese interests would necessarily be incomplete. The same situation
existed with respect to the airlines. International airline services in the
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post–World War II period continue to be based on a web of bilaterally
negotiated agreements in which governments in effect offer foreign car-
rier access to domestic “gateways” in exchange for reciprocal access for
their own national carriers to their negotiating partner’s gateways. Such
a system encourages a bilateral division of traffic between two countries,
thereby hampering the development of unilateral monopolistic or oligop-
olistic control by a single nation’s carriers over a given air route. As I dis-
cuss in more detail later, in the Japanese case, a distinctive stipulation in
that country’s bilateral aviation treaty signed with the United States in
1952 effectively locked in an existing US carrier dominance over air access
to and from Japan (LaCroix and Wolf 1995; Yamauchi and Ito 1996; Jaggi
and Morgan 1996).
As for South Korean and Taiwanese overseas tourism, elements of the
Japanese pattern have been unfolding with a fifteen- to twenty-five-year
lag. Taiwan began liberalizing overseas travel regulations in 1979. As of
1990, embarkation and disembarkation forms were no longer required of
residents, and the amount of foreign exchange that could be taken out of
the country was increased to us$5 million per year (Huang, Yung, and
Huang 1996, 224). South Korea followed suit by liberalizing its overseas
travel procedures and foreign exchange controls in 1989 (Korea Travel
News 1989). These liberalizations were followed by dramatic increases in
the number of overseas travelers from the two countries. Personnel able
to speak the languages and sensitive to the customs of these countries were
in short supply at overseas destinations (Ahmed and Chon 1994). In both
instances low-cost package tours sold by domestically based travel agen-
cies have come to serve as the primary mode of overseas travel. It is
unclear at this point whether or not the Asian financial crisis that began
in 1997 will alter this pattern. In any event, given the smaller population
bases of the two countries it is unlikely that either will generate an over-
seas tourist population that exceeds the Japanese in size. 
The Political Economy of Interstate Tourism
Development in Micronesia
Micronesia’s trust territory status meant that air transport within the ter-
ritory was regulated by the domestic aviation regime of the United States,
while foreign access to the region was governed by the provisions of avi-
ation treaties negotiated by the United States with foreign governments.
Under the original provisions of the 1952 US-Japan treaty, access to the
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United States by Japan’s international carriers was restricted to the five
designated “gateways” of Guam, Saipan, Honolulu, Anchorage, San Fran-
cisco, and New York, while US access to Japan was restricted to the gate-
ways of Tokyo and Osaka. Naha was added to the list when Okinawa
reverted to Japan in 1972. (Each country was free to choose other points
of origin within their respective countries.) Carrier service between the
two countries was effectively limited to four designated “incumbent” air-
lines—Japan Airlines (jal) on the Japanese side, and Pan American
(PanAm), Northwest, and the cargo carrier Flying Tiger on the American.
While carriers from both countries were in theory free to increase or
reduce capacity on their designated routes at will, in practice the over-
crowded conditions at the Tokyo and Osaka airports meant that the Jap-
anese Ministry of Transportation was in a position to regulate capacity
through its control over the allocation of “slots” (takeoff and landing
permits) at these airports. Any significant changes to this bilateral regime
thus had to be attained through agreements ironed out in bilateral nego-
tiations (Yamauchi and Ito 1996, 47–49; LaCroix and Wolf 1995).
Exclusive right to provide “domestic” service within the Trust Terri-
tory and between parts of the territory and the United States was origi-
nally granted to PanAm. However, since PanAm was at the time the pre-
mier American international carrier, it did not put a high priority on its
Micronesian operations and there were incessant complaints about its
poor service. PanAm’s rights in the region were subsequently transferred
to the Continental Airlines–affiliated Air Micronesia (later renamed Con-
tinental Micronesia) on a temporary basis in 1968. The airline was per-
manently certified on these routes in 1971. Under the mandate granted to
Continental, in addition to providing air service to the region, the com-
pany was committed to promoting tourism development and the training
and recruitment of local personnel in the travel industry. In response to
these provisions, Continental built a chain of “Continental” hotels in three
district centers in the Trust Territory (Kelley and Penseyres 1976, 8).
The combination of the US-Japan aviation treaty and the intraregional
arrangements centered around Air Micronesia had a number of implica-
tions for tourism development in the region. Perhaps most obvious, the
designation of Guam and Saipan as gateways virtually guaranteed that
increases in traffic from Japan would tend to concentrate at these two
destinations. PanAm initiated direct flights between Tokyo and Guam in
1967, and Japan Airlines followed suit in 1970, opening the way for
Guam’s emergence as a popular honeymoon destination for Japanese
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newlyweds. Beyond these developments, little incentive existed for the
two airlines to promote Micronesian destinations outside Guam and Sai-
pan since access to these destinations was controlled by Air Micronesia. 
From Continental’s perspective, on the other hand, there was a strong
commercial incentive to try to extend its pan-Pacific reach (achieved
through Air Micronesia’s Trust Territory connections) by adding a route
that would connect its Micronesia network with Japan. Doing so would
not only offer the prospect of turning the chronically unprofitable Air
Micronesia around through the added passenger load, but would also
provide a new source of guests for its hotels in the region. Domestic and
international politics, however, frustrated Continental’s bid. An agree-
ment authorizing the initiation of service between Saipan and Tokyo,
which Continental wanted, had been reached in bilateral negotiations in
1969 and Japan Airlines began flights the following year. An upgrading
of the Saipan airport to allow the landing of wide-body jets was begun
around this time. On the US side, however, fierce jockeying between
PanAm and Continental delayed the designation of a US carrier for the
route. Civil Aeronautics Board hearings on carrier designation were not
initiated until 1971. The infighting continued, and it was not until August
1976 that President Gerald Ford finally approved Air Micronesia’s desig-
nation as the US carrier for the Saipan-Japan route (Davies 1984, 59–64).
Unfortunately for Air Micronesia, additional hurdles had to be over-
come. The Japanese feeling that unfair advantages had been given to the
United States in the 1952 aviation treaty intensified as the number of Jap-
anese passengers began to exceed those from the United States and the
margin widened. Dissatisfaction built up to the point that the Japanese
government was induced to initiate a full-fledged renegotiation of the
treaty. Not surprisingly on its part, the United States was unwilling to
entertain a reworking of the treaty’s basic principles. Air Micronesia’s Sai-
pan-Tokyo service bid became caught up in the resulting deadlock as Jap-
anese officials held Air Micronesia’s slots in Tokyo hostage for conces-
sions from the United States. A “memorandum of understanding” that
authorized Air Micronesia’s Tokyo-Saipan route was at last signed in July
1977, and service was initiated in October—eight years after the route
was initially authorized (PIM, June 1977; Doty 1977a, 1977b).
Air Micronesia’s attainment of access to the Japanese market, together
with the counterpart expansions of Japan Airlines’ service to the region,
resulted in an increase in the number of seats available for Japanese tourist
travel to Guam and Saipan and also made other Micronesian destinations
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somewhat more accessible to Japanese tourists. However, the resulting
increases in capacity paled in comparison to the dramatic increases that
followed the wave of liberalization that washed over the international
airline industry in the 1980s. The impact of this movement was first felt
in the Micronesian region when, after the conclusion of a “record of com-
munication” between the United States and Japan in 1982, the city of
Nagoya was opened to Air Micronesia and the way was opened for All
Nippon Airways (ana), Japan’s second largest airline, to begin operating
charter flights between Guam, Saipan, and Tokyo. A new memorandum
of understanding in 1985 removed earlier restrictions on Air Micronesia’s
equipment size and also authorized the airline to add routes linking Guam
and Saipan with the additional Japanese cities of Osaka, Fukuoka, and
Naha. The same memorandum also authorized the entry of Japanese air-
lines other than Japan Airlines on Japan-Guam routes, paving the way for
All Nippon Airways to open regular service between Tokyo’s Narita Air-
port and Guam in July. A 1989 memorandum of understanding made
possible jal service between Nagoya and Saipan or Guam, ana service
between Narita and Saipan, and Air Micronesia connections to Sendai.
The consequences of this wave of airline liberalization are reflected in the
relevant statistics. The number of Japanese visitors arriving in Guam
grew from roughly 153,000 in 1977 to 222,000 in 1980. By 1990, this
figure had nearly tripled to 638,000 (gvb 1998).
In the original Civil Aeronautics Board authorization of Continental’s
Micronesian entry was the requirement that the company pursue hotel
development, on grounds that limited tourism infrastructure was an
important obstacle to further expansion of tourism in the region. In the
absence of a history of overseas tourism, international tourist-class hotel
rooms were nonexistent in most areas of Micronesia. Continental’s hotel
projects, which at 50 to 200 rooms were small by international standards,
were unprecedentedly large by earlier regional standards. Further invest-
ment in hotel rooms was unlikely without firm prospects for increased
tourist traffic. Although the initial boom in Asia-Pacific tourism spurred
by Japanese overseas travelers was promising, the political geography of
the region and the difficult diplomacy of airline negotiations provided
only modest incentives for hotel development.
Under these circumstances, it was not surprising that Japanese investors
took the initiative to develop hotels in Guam for Japanese visitors spurring
a steady increase in hotel capacity (figure 2). Given the near absence of
preexisting tourist-oriented hotel development, in contrast to major des-
424 the contemporary pacific • fall 2000
tinations elsewhere, there were almost no barriers to oligopolization by
Japanese tourism-related interests. As a result, the organization of Japan-
ese tourism in Guam came to reflect the quintessential tendencies built
into the Japanese travel industry system. By 1984, four of the eight resort
hotels on Guam were owned by Japanese interests, and two others were
managed by Japanese firms. Guam had by this time developed into a siz-
able destination for Japanese tourists (90 percent of visitors to Guam in
1984 were from Japan), so the leading travel agencies had established
operations on the island. In addition to lining up families of affiliated
tour operators, long-term business ties were established with local restau-
rants, shops, and tourist attractions. Kickbacks and commissions pro-
vided an important way for tour companies to compensate for the low
price of tour packages and helped to further solidify the Japan-based net-
work that oligopolized Japanese tourism in Guam. As one observer wrote,
“no other tourist destination in the world is so completely locked up by
a single source of travelers and investors” (Nygard 1984, 11). Expanded
air service did little to alter the situation, and as Saipan came into its own
as a major site for Japanese tourism in the latter half of the 1980s,
Guam’s experience was duplicated. A survey article in the Guam Business
News a decade later concluded, “Almost all of the 549,643 Japanese
Figure 2. Growth in numbers of hotel rooms in Guam, Palau, and the North-
ern Marianas. (Sources: Guam Visitors Bureau; CNMI Visitors Bureau; Palau
Visitors Authority.)
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tourists who came to Guam, and the 345,971 who came to the Northern
Mariana Islands, in 1993 were brought by tour-package wholesalers based
in Japan. Travel arrangements in the Mariana Islands were handled by
tour companies with offices on Guam and Saipan, most of them subsid-
iaries of the major tour wholesalers” (Jackson 1994, 20). A companion
article in the same issue commented that “the Japanese segment of the
tourism industry is very integrated, with little opportunity for local busi-
nesses to participate,” and detailed the situation with a company-by-com-
pany analysis of business ties (Russel 1994, 12).
Although Japanese interests had effectively “locked up” the business of
Japanese tourism on Guam and Saipan, the “lock” was not exclusively
that of the majors. A number of smaller Japanese wholesalers specializing
in Guam and Micronesia were able to carve a niche in the industry, in
part because of the long period of gestation prior to the expansion of air
capacity from Japan to Guam and Saipan, as well as the absence of exist-
ing large, international-class hotels. Further, Air Micronesia, a “nonin-
cumbent” under the bilateral aviation regime, claimed a large share of the
air capacity in the region. Smaller Japanese agencies with business ties to
Air Micronesia and specializing in travel services in the region were able
to carve out a viable niche prior to the arrival of the majors, especially in
the less popular destinations. Even in Guam, where mass Japanese tour-
ism emerged first and unfolded on the largest scale, firms like r&c Tours
(which has close ties to Air Micronesia) and ric Tours continue to com-
pete head-to-head with mega-wholesalers like Japan Travel Bureau.
The control over access to tourism resources established by Japanese
travel agency networks in Guam and Saipan also had implications for the
“latecomer” tourists from Taiwan and South Korea, whose number began
to grow significantly during the 1990s. In a manner that parallels how
Japanese travel firms were confronted with preexisting non-Japanese
hotel interests in major global travel destinations, Korean and Taiwanese
travel firms were confronted with a market in which key resources were
controlled by outside interests. Their business is welcomed when there are
rooms to be filled, but during peak periods when rooms are scarce the
Korean and Taiwanese firms are at a decided disadvantage. This situation
probably explains the larger share accounted for by Korean tourists in the
secondary destination of Saipan. A further case in point occurred during
the particularly tight Chinese New Year period of 1994, when Taiwanese
tourists were effectively locked out of the most desirable hotels (Galang
1995). Although the details are somewhat hazy, the experience might have
served as a catalyst for the redirection of travelers to Palau. 
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International Tourism in Palau
The perceived promise of tourism as an engine of the Palauan economy
may be understood by looking at recent trends in foreign tourism there.
Although the market is rather small (73,719 visitor arrivals in 1997),
growth has been impressive in recent years, and what seems like a tiny
drop in the tourism bucket elsewhere goes far in a country with 17,000
residents. The number of visitor arrivals grew by an annual average of 12
percent during the first half of the 1990s (Khalegi 1996, 4). According to
a Bank of Hawaii study, tourist spending as measured by receipts of local
vendors increased 41.6 percent from 1991 to 1993, from $12.5 million to
$17.7 million. For the period 1994 to 1996, the figures were $27.5 million
to $67.9 million, for an increase of 147 percent (Bank of Hawaii 1997c,
21). Another source estimated that export income earned from tourism in
1996 was $46.8 million, or about 81 percent of total export income
(Palau Office of Planning and Statistics, nd). Moreover, this rapid growth
in tourism occurred in a context where the shares of key sectors such as
agriculture, fisheries, and public administration were declining steadily.
Tourist spending increased its share of Palau’s total gross domestic prod-
uct from 14.9 percent to 23.3 percent from 1991 to 1993, and from 31.0
percent to 46.0 percent from 1994 to 1996 (Bank of Hawaii, 1997c, 21).
Palau is currently the third largest visitor destination in the Micronesian
region in terms of the total number of visitors annually (table 1). There is
also an extremely large gap, along the lines of an order of magnitude,
between Palau’s figures and those of second-ranked Saipan. The reasons
for Palau’s “distant third” status are implicit in the preceding discussion,
but it is helpful to treat them more directly here in order to flesh out future
scenarios for tourism development there.
A certain historical inevitability about Guam’s emergence as Microne-
sia’s largest tourist destination in the last quarter century was not dupli-
cated in Saipan and Palau. As the area’s largest island, Guam possessed
some natural advantages for tourism development, but probably more
decisive factors were its designation as a port of entry into the United
States in the bilateral Japan-US aviation treaty and its status as a US terri-
tory. Tourists were channeled from the growing Japanese market to Guam,
and the relatively open and uncomplicated American legal framework for
foreign investment facilitated the construction of a “tourist-class” infra-
structure. The two factors worked synergistically to spur Guam’s emer-
gence as the aviation and tourism hub of the Micronesian region.
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The number two status of Saipan, which like Palau was part of the
Trust Territory, was less of a given and serves to highlight the role of polit-
ical and economic variables in shaping Palau’s situation. Palau’s physical
attributes are certainly no less attractive for tourism than Saipan’s, and
Palau possesses a slight advantage insofar as Babeldaob, the second largest
landmass in Micronesia, offers a much larger area for tourism develop-
ment. Palau is also less prone to the typhoons that regularly disrupt tourist
flows and cause physical damage in Guam and Saipan. Furthermore, as
occasional group visits by wartime veterans and former Japanese residents
of Palau indicate, Palau’s status as the former capital of the Japanese South
Sea territory gives it a potential edge as a cultural and historical destina-
tion for East Asia’s largest overseas tourist market. Although Saipan is
closer to Japan, the difference in terms of direct flight time is relatively
small and is often negated for the large number of tourists who stop over
in Hagatna.
Saipan’s status relative to Palau is most convincingly explained by the
“political” factors of its designation as a port of entry in the Japan-US avi-
ation treaty and its early negotiation of commonwealth status rather than
its “natural” attributes. Thanks to the bilateral treaty, by the 1970s both
Japanese and American airlines could fly directly to Saipan from Japan,
while Palau was restricted to indirect access on a spur route monopolized
by a single American airline. In addition, by resolving key uncertainties of
political status and giving the appearance of a resolution of land tenure
issues, Saipan’s early achievement of commonwealth status tended to reas-
sure would-be investors in tourism development projects. By contrast,
during this period Palau was embroiled in a long and bitter conflict over
its future political status that was not conducive to similar investment pro-
jects. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Palau’s devel-
opment as an international tourism destination lagged behind Saipan’s. 
Like that of other areas in the former Trust Territory, Palau’s initial
development as a tourist destination was closely tied to the policies and
fortunes of Air Micronesia. Regularly scheduled air service to Palau was
initiated in the late 1960s along with the rest of the airline’s Trust Terri-
tory service. However, Palau did not lie on Air Micronesia’s trunk route
from Honolulu to Hagatna. As in other parts of the territory, Palau’s first
“tourist” hotel, the 56-room, $2.18 million Palau Continental Hotel in
Koror, was built as part of the development agreement that Air Microne-
sia signed in order to gain US government approval to operate in the
region. While similar in scale to the one built by Continental in Chuuk,
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the hotel was considerably smaller than those built in Saipan (184 rooms)
and Guam (200 rooms) (Kelley and Penseyres 1976, 11). Various schemes
were advanced by local Micronesian interests in the ensuing years for fur-
ther major hotel developments in Palau, but none bore fruit. 
In the meantime, the number of Japanese overseas travelers began to
increase conspicuously, and Japanese businesses began to take an interest
in tourism development in Palau as a supplementary destination to the
core attractions of Guam. The first major indicator of this interest was
Japan Airlines’ purchase in 1981 of the Palau Continental, which was
renamed the Hotel Nikko Palau. However, the first major jump in Palau’s
tourist-class hotel capacity did not occur until the opening of the 100-
room Palau Pacific Resort complex in 1985, which nearly tripled the
country’s capacity in its class. The project was initiated by one of Japan’s
leading real estate developers, the Tokyu Land Corporation. The project
differed from the earlier Continental project in that it was built, as its
name implies, as a more or less self-contained luxury beach resort away
from downtown Koror. Personal interest on the part of Tokyu’s president
apparently had as much to do with the project’s initiation and completion
as nuts-and-bolts business calculations. Despite the Japanese connection,
the hotel was not built to service Japanese guests exclusively, since accord-
ing to its public relations manager only 60 percent of its guests were
expected to be Japanese. Western expatriates in Asia were a major target
for the non-Japanese segment of the projected clientele (Link 1985). In
terms of its corporate structure, the Palau Pacific Resort was placed in the
more internationalized Pan Pacific group of hotels rather than in the
domestically based Tokyu Group’s main line of hotels, a fact consistent
with this reading.
The logistics and economics of air travel and accommodation as they
have developed in Palau have given Japanese tourists there a different pro-
file from those who visit Guam and Saipan. At the economic end of the
picture, the need for travelers to change planes in Hagatna added to the
time and expense associated with a tour package. Whereas during the
winter of 1997 a typical tour to Guam or Saipan was a four-day package
priced at between 40,000 and 60,000 yen, the counterpart for Palau was
five days for a minimum of 80,000 to 120,000 yen, causing it to straddle
the 100,000-yen line used in the industry to distinguish “affordable”
packages from premium ones. Thus, other things being equal, Japanese
visitors to Palau would tend to be more wealthy and have more free time
than their compatriots visiting Guam or Saipan. The relative absence of
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shops featuring designer-label merchandise and the large stage shows and
nightclubs that are the staples of Japanese tourism in Guam and Saipan
meant that the typical Japanese visitor to Palau was seeking something
different, such as diving or a change from the hustle and bustle of Japan-
ese urban life. In a nutshell, in Guam the Japanese visitor profile is that
of a low-cost, “mass-market tourist,” while in Palau it is that of a pre-
mium “niche-market tourist.” 
Palau’s secondary status within the overall framework of the Japanese
overseas travel industry is also reflected in how the business aspects of Jap-
anese tour services are organized. In contrast to the situation in Guam and
Saipan, none of the leading travel agencies directly administers branches
in Palau, and tour operations are generally owned and handled by Palau-
ans with Japanese connections. In this respect Palau is free from the “spi-
der’s web” of tight business connections among firms that handle Japan-
ese tourists that local operators in Guam complain about. Nonetheless,
the timing of the Palau Pacific Resort’s opening allowed it to take nearly
exclusive advantage of the boom in Japanese overseas travel that occurred
in the mid-1980s. With little competition and with steady access provided
by Continental Micronesia, the hotel did well enough to expand its
capacity to 160 rooms in 1994. At the same time, however, the scale of
Japanese tourism in Palau has been modest enough that the “majors” of
the Japanese industry have not found it in their interest to establish direct
operations.
A new element was introduced into the Palauan international tourism
picture in 1995. As detailed by Eric Harwit, Taiwan’s willingness to offer
business and investment in exchange for support in its diplomatic com-
petition with mainland China dovetailed with Palau’s new political status
to create a rapidly expanding Taiwan-based tourism. In exchange for
Palau’s waiving of the complicated visa acquisition procedures that Tai-
wanese travelers are forced to endure in most countries, Taiwanese busi-
ness and government interests arranged for regular air service between
the two countries (Harwit, this issue). Along with the air service came a
number of new Taiwan-financed tourism-related development projects in
Palau, the most prominent of which is the recently completed Palasia
Hotel in downtown Koror. 
Since 1995 Taiwanese tourism in Palau has taken on many of the char-
acteristics of mass market tourism. The most fundamental reason for this
is the distinctive way in which Taiwan’s diplomatic situation and relative
lateness as a tourist exporting country intersected with the economics of
430 the contemporary pacific • fall 2000
air travel in the context of Palau’s relative “underdevelopment” as a
tourist destination. The options available to Taiwan citizens for a “quick
getaway” vacation were limited by the difficulty of obtaining visas. On
top of this, the preemption of prime hotel facilities by the large, well-
heeled Japanese travel agencies meant that Taiwanese visitors were often
“squeezed out” of desirable resorts. Thus, when Palau opened its market
to visitors from Taiwan in 1995, it was tapping into a pent-up demand.
On top of this, the initiation of regular air services from Taiwan to Palau,
which initially included Continental Micronesia, in addition to Taiwan’s
Far Eastern Air Transport, meant that a large number of seats now
needed to be filled on a regular basis—40,000 or so annually according
to one study (Harwit, this issue). While these flights are filled to capacity
during peak season, off-peak load factors (that is, passengers divided by
capacity) at times fall below 50 percent. The severe imbalance between
capacity and demand creates pressure on travel agencies and tour opera-
tors who buy seats from the airline in blocks for an entire season, to offer
tours at low prices and to make up lost revenue at the destination. In con-
trast to destinations with a large stock of “tourist-class” hotel operators
with whom to share these cost pressures, Palau offers the tour operators
relatively little room to attract customers by offering discounts on rooms
in normally expensive hotels. The result is that tour operators’ efforts to
recoup lost revenues tend to take the form of demands on local restau-
rants, shops, and other local businesses involved in the industry to offer
steep discounts, rebates, and other “incentives.” 
Under these circumstances it is not surprising that complaints about
these practices by Taiwanese tour operators are widely heard in Palau.
The rapid growth of tourism in Palau has caused other problems as well.
The most recognized has been the damage to the ecosystem. Stories cir-
culate widely about fan and other forms of coral being trampled by non-
swimming groups of tourists, and others catching and eating Palau’s
famous freshwater jellyfish. Visible at the previously pristine beaches are
evidence of increased runoff, a compacting of sand, litter, and other envi-
ronmental disruptions. Equally significant has been the increased strain
on the country’s limited infrastructure due to increases in demand for
water and power, as well as perceived social disruption. Also discussed in
this regard has been a dramatic increase in the number of foreign work-
ers as the demand for labor has outstripped the supply of Palauans will-
ing to work in tourism-related industries. On the business side, people
have complained that the industry is not contributing all that it should to
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the local economy. According to estimates by the Palau Visitors Author-
ity, 85 percent of tourism revenues are being pocketed by foreign opera-
tors and suppliers, many of whom also escape payment of various taxes
and fees through the use of “front” businesses registered in the name of
a Palauan owner but controlled by foreign interests. The authority esti-
mates that only 15 percent of tourism revenues remain in Palau, which in
absolute terms amounts to a mere $250 per Palauan (pva 1997, 13).
Concluding Remarks
The essence of the economic challenge facing Palau as understood by the
local community has been succinctly expressed in a recent government
development plan:
Palau has few resources to offer the rest of the world in order to support its
desired lifestyle and enhance its culture and environment. However, those
which it has—a unique and fascinating array of reefs, water and islands—are
in diminishing supply and are located adjacent to the world’s fastest growing
areas of demand. Necessity and proximity now combine to possibly threaten
the fragile culture and ecosystem of Palau. The challenge to decision makers
is to open up good quality tourism facilities to an increasing number of
investors and visitors without causing intolerable damage to the attractions
and Palau social system. (Palau 1994, 2:169) 
A distinctive feature of the discourse about tourism development in Palau
is the frequent contrasting of desirable “up-market” tourism with unde-
sirable “mass-market” tourism, which is viewed as the primary source of
the various negative consequences being generated by the increasing num-
bers of tourists: 
Budget [mass-market] travelers frequently have a greater impact on the social
and cultural environment than the quality/experienced [ie, up-market] travel-
ers. They arrive in large numbers and have a cumulative effect on the resources.
They are often first time international travelers and may demonstrate imma-
ture and unwanted behavior—loud, intrusive, demanding and disrespectful of
the local environment. These qualities are exhibited by most travelers from
any country who have not had the experience to establish a conscientious
travel ethic. 
Mass travel is also tightly controlled by the country of origin. Margins are
very thin and therefore it is critical that the tour operators /wholesalers who
package this market have vertically integrated travel products that enable
small profit from each component of the product. This frequently excludes a
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significant participation of the local ground operators and suppliers. (pva
1997, 14)
According to this line of thought, mass-market tourism does not simply
generate problems of its own, but is also a positive threat to desirable, up-
scale tourism: “The mass market is already half the volume to Palau and
within the next three years will outnumber the quality small /group For-
eign Independent Traveler (fit) market by two to one. This is a tenuous
situation which could result in the eventual elimination of the high end
market who will readily shift to other destinations for the experience they
enjoyed in Palau five to ten years ago” (pva 1997, 14).
In this paper I have examined the historical and regional context of
tourism in Palau with an emphasis on the associated political economy of
interstate tourism. Various forces have worked to make Palau a secondary,
niche market within the larger pattern of tourism flows in the Microne-
sian region, but with an incipient mass-market element (Taiwanese tour-
ism), also profoundly shaped by politics. Among these various elements
the pattern of air route allocation produced by the earlier trust territory
status of Micronesia and the bilateral US-Japan aviation treaty played a
fundamental role. The gaining of Palauan independence in 1994, and
with it direct national control over air traffic into and out of Palau, estab-
lished the potential for reshaping the parameters of Palauan tourism on
radically different terms.
Palau has already seen some of the consequences of mass tourism in its
experience with Taiwan tourists. Depending on how tourism development
unfolds, a mass-oriented Japanese tourism based on cut-rate packages
marketed by the big travel agencies is a possible future scenario. The con-
struction of a paved road around the entire island of Babeldaob is under-
way and it is widely anticipated that this will lead to major investments in
tourism facilities, including new golf courses and hotels. Furthermore,
political independence means that Palau is no longer bound by the provi-
sions of the bilateral aviation arrangements based on the Japan-US avia-
tion treaty and is free to negotiate flights directly with Japan and other
countries. Regularly scheduled direct charter flights now fly between
Japan and Palau. Discussions are under way for the creation of a Japan-
financed Palauan national carrier that would presumably service routes
to and from Japan. In the past, the limited seats, poor connections, small
number of hotel rooms, and limited variety of available leisure activities
meant that tourism in Palau was not on a scale sufficient to induce the
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big Japanese travel interests to establish direct operations. However, the
development of Babeldaob could conceivably push Palau over the thresh-
old, leading very rapidly to precisely the kind of mass-market develop-
ment and oligopolization that the country is ostensibly seeking to avoid. 
In its Sustainable Development Plan, the Palau Visitors Authority has
outlined a path of tourism development focused on ecotourism and cul-
tural tourism as a way to minimize environmental damage, further
national identity, keep a greater share of tourism revenues in Palau, and
avoid foreign domination of the industry both in terms of ownership and
the workforce (1997). The plan would involve measures to increase local
participation, providing appropriate training and assistance to Palauans
entering the tourism industry. It would also attempt to control the growth
of the industry and redirect it to provide opportunities more suited to
Palauan sensibilities. It would involve strict regulation of tourism activi-
ties in order to forestall environmental damage to land and marine
resources and the training of both locals and visitors for a more ecologi-
cally friendly interaction with the natural environment. 
If successfully implemented, such a strict, nationalistic approach to
tourism development would undoubtedly limit the attractiveness of Palau
as a site for foreign investment, potentially depriving Palau of the capital
it needs to sustain the development of the industry as its compact mon-
eys run dry. This cost may have to be borne if the vision of tourism devel-
opment laid out in the plan is to be attained, although in the long run the
success of such a strategy will no doubt enhance the viability and value
of Palau as a destination in its desired market. One issue that deserves
exploration as a way of alleviating potential capital shortfalls is whether
or not Japanese overseas development assistance can be used to advance
the sustainable tourism envisioned. Japan, after all, has pursued an
increased diplomatic presence while emphasizing its ostensible commit-
ment to ecological values and cultural sensitivity in its relations with the
Pacific Islands region (Urabe 1996; Finin and Wesley-Smith 1997). Effec-
tive internal governance and tremendous diplomatic skill will clearly be
required if current sustainable tourism plans are to succeed in Palau. 
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